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Modern communication strives towards provably secure systems which can be widely deployed. Quantum key distri-
bution provides a methodology to verify the integrity and security of a key exchange based on physical laws. However,
physical systems often fall short of theoretical models, meaning they can be compromised through uncharacterized
side-channels. The complexity of detection means that the measurement system is a vulnerable target for an adversary.
Here, we present secure key exchange up to 200 km while removing all side-channels from the measurement system.
We use mass-manufacturable, monolithically integrated transmitters that represent an accessible, quantum-ready
communication platform. This work demonstrates a network topology that allows secure equipment sharing which is
accessible with a cost-effective transmitter, significantly reducing the barrier for widespread uptake of quantum-secured
communication.
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maintain attribution to the author(s) and the published article’s title, journal citation, andDOI.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Quantum technologies promise a paradigm shift, compared to
their classical counterparts, that will undermine our current meth-
ods of secure communication [1]. It will soon become necessary
to deploy key exchange systems that are immune to such increases
in computing power. Quantum key distribution (QKD) is one
such approach, which exploits quantum phenomena to exchange
secret keys between distant parties without relying on assumed
computationally hard problems [2,3]. However, the stringent
requirements for precise control have predominately limited QKD
systems to small networks and laboratories. To realize ubiquitous
quantum devices, new platforms are required for robust operation
in harsh environments.
Integrated photonics has seen vast improvements in recent
years and represents a promising platform for mass-adoption of
quantum technologies [4]. In particular, indium phosphide (InP)
offers crucial benefits for communication in a robust, phase-stable,
and compact platform. Lasers can be monolithically integrated
with mW powers and narrow linewidths; fast electro-optic phase
modulation can reach bandwidths of 40 GHz and low-loss waveg-
uides allow efficient routing [5]. Such components mean that it is
well suited for quantum communication protocols [6].
Quantum key distribution has been a leading quantum tech-
nology since its advent [2,3], and has seen many proof-of-principle
demonstrations, networks, and commercial systems [7–11].
However, implementation security of these systems is an active
area of research due to potential information leakage that is not
considered in security proofs. Such side-channels may allow an
eavesdropper to gain sensitive information during a key exchange
[12], or an attacker to manipulate a system and determine the
secret key through classical means [13].
To counter these attacks from a malicious adversary through
uncharacterized side-channels, device-independent QKD schemes
have been developed to limit the number of assumptions required
for security [14]. One such vulnerability is with single-photon
detectors, for which measurement-device-independent quantum
key distribution (MDI-QKD) has been proposed. This approach
removes all possible attacks against the detection system [15].
In this paper, we experimentally demonstrate MDI-QKD using
cost-effective, mass-manufacturable, chip-based transmitters that
could facilitate commercial quantum-secured communication.
We show that 1 kbps of secret key can be exchanged at 100 km,
and predict positive key rates at more than 350 km. The system
removes detector vulnerabilities and represents a viable solution for
near-term metropolitan quantum networks.
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Fig. 1. Integrated MDI-QKD: (a) Schematic of the 6× 2 mm2 InP chips used to generate the time-bin encoded BB84 weak coherent states through
cascaded MZIs. Timing information is encoded with T. Enc, decoy intensities varied with I. Mod , and phase encoded with Ph. Enc. A 1 GHz photodiode
(PD) can be used for power monitoring and feedback. (b) Microscope images of the on-chip DBR laser (top) and an MZI (bottom) measuring only 1 mm
in length. (c) Bell state projections for |ψ+〉 (purple) and |ψ−〉 (red) in time-bin encoding. t ij corresponds to a detection event in the i th detector, where j
is either an early (e ) or late (l ) time-bin. (d) MDI-QKD experimental schematic. Two identical devices generate BB84 states independently and send them
to the receiver. The states are projected in the Bell basis using a beam splitter and single-photon detectors (SPDs). A bank of four detectors is used to increase
count rate, coincidence probability, and key rate.
2. RESULTS
A. Protocol
MDI-QKD removes all potential side channels on the detection
system which could be exploited by a malicious adversary [15]. A
schematic of the experiment is shown in Fig. 1. Unlike traditional
point-to-point protocols, Alice and Bob act symmetrically by send-
ing BB84 states to a third party, Charlie. Upon receipt of the states,
Charlie measures the states in the Bell basis and publicly announces
all successful events. The outcomes indicate quantum correlations
between states but, without encoding knowledge known only by
Alice and Bob, reveal no information about the secret key. This
allows Charlie to be completely untrusted, and it could even be
assumed that an adversary is operating the receiver without com-
promising the security. By sharing the basis information for each
state, Alice and Bob are able to infer a secret key which can be used
in a symmetric key algorithm.
As we use a weak coherent source, we need to estimate the num-
ber of single-photon events. We employ a four-intensity decoy state
analysis [16] to bound the single-photon errors and yields. In this
protocol, the Z basis is used to generate the key while the X basis
bounds the knowledge of an eavesdropper.
While MDI-QKD typically offers a lower key rate at short dis-
tances when compared with point-to-point systems [6], it can gen-
erate key rate at greater distances [7], as the errors are proportional
to the square of the dark count probability. It also offers the poten-
tial for the measurement equipment to be shared between multiple
parties through optical switching without compromising security.
B. Transmitters
Indium phosphide allows monolithic integration of all the required
optical components for photonic quantum technology in a single
platform [5,6]. Entirely on-chip components were used to gen-
erate high-fidelity, phase-randomized, 250 MHz clocked BB84
weak coherent states, as required for quantum key distribution. A
schematic of the chip is shown in Fig. 1(a).
On-chip tunable distributed Bragg reflectors (DBRs) form
an optical cavity around a waveguide-integrated semiconductor
optical amplifier (SOA) to create a Fabry–Pérot laser with 50 dB
sideband suppression and a 30 pm linewidth. The linewidth mea-
surement is limited by the optical spectrum analyzer resolution
(30 pm), and is expected to be smaller. The laser has a broad tuning
capability of 10 nm within the telecomms C-band through current
injection of the DBRs. Alternatively, current injection of the SOA
allows fine tuning in steps of 80 fm. Crucially, no wavelength
filtering beyond the on-chip cavity was required, ensuring easy
wavelength tuning that is compatible with modern wavelength
division multiplexing techniques while maintaining high-fidelity
interference between independent devices.
Phase randomization was achieved through gain switching of
the SOA, as required by decoy state analysis [16]. By exploiting
the short upper-state and cavity lifetimes of the integrated laser,
−1.5 V 200 ps FWHM electrical pulses drain the cavity to gen-
erate 4 ns phase-randomized windows. At the start of a window,
the laser shows relaxation oscillations for 1 ns until returning to a
useful continuous operation. Quantum states can then be encoded
in phase-coherent time bins.
Electro-optic phase modulation (EOPM) was achieved through
a quantum-confined Stark effect (QCSE) which has a band-
width of >10 GHz. The efficacy of the QCSE means that the
required voltages are lower when compared with other technolo-
gies, such as lithium niobate, and can be as small as 0.5 mm in
length. Together with multimode interferometers (MMIs), we
create Mach–Zehnder interferometers (MZIs) that demonstrate
30 dB extinction. 120 ps electrical pulses are used to encode timing
information in 500 ps separated bins, resulting in 130 ps FWHM
pulses when detector jitter is considered.
State intensity was modulated through the absorption of the
QCSE to generate varying photon numbers for decoy state analy-
sis. Square electrical signals allowed an intensity swing of 20 dB to
generate signal and decoy states. Only this stage of the state prepa-
ration required a multi-level electrical signal. However, the signals
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were still limited to only three levels in order to reduce the power
consumption compared to an arbitrary level signal. A vacuum state
was encoded by not pulsing the time-encoding MZI.
Finally, a relative phase between the two time bins was required
for the X basis. A |+〉 state is defined with no phase between the
early and late time bins, while a relative pi phase is required to
encode |−〉. To avoid phase-dependent losses associated with the
QCSE, the phase between time bins was encoded using a further
MZI. By applying a phase shift to the top EOPM in the MZI in
the first time bin, and the bottom EOPM in the second, a pi phase
is applied between the two pulses without decreasing the inten-
sity of the state. A histogram of the four BB84 states is shown in
Fig. 2, which demonstrates the 30 dB extinction ratio and 130 ps
FWHM.
Electrical signals were generated by synchronized pulse pattern
generators, arbitrary waveform generators, and FPGAs. All signals
are kept below 4 Vpp, which demonstrates reduced power require-
ments compared to fiber-based systems. Moreover, an effort has
been made to reduce the number of multi-level signals required,
as generating two level states is less demanding than completely
arbitrary waveforms. Such considerations will be crucial for wide
adoption of quantum-secured communication.
C. Detection
Alice and Bob’s states were projected in the Bell basis using a 50:50
fiber beam splitter, and coincidences between single-photon detec-
tors indicated successful measurements. In a time-bin encoding,
coincidences between early and late bins differentiate between
|ψ±〉, as shown in Fig. 1(c). While is it only possible to project onto
two of the four Bell states with linear optics [17], only a single Bell
state is required for MDI-QKD [15].
The Bell state projections require Hong-Ou-Mandel (HOM)
interference [18,19] at the beam splitter between states sent by
Alice and Bob. Therefore, the two independent transmitters
need to send states that are indistinguishable in time of arrival,
polarization, photon number, and wavelength to ensure maximal
interference.
The relative timing of the transmitters was controlled by
tunable electronic delays with 1 ps resolution and a classical,
optical signal was used to synchronize the transmitter clocks
with the time-tagging electronics. Polarizing beam splitters and
polarization controllers ensured that the states sent by the trans-
mitters were both linearly polarized and had a good overlap at
Fig. 2. BB84 States: Histogram of the weak coherent states generated
on-chip as measured by single-photon detectors. The time bins are sepa-
rated by 500 ps and exhibit a 30 dB extinction ratio and 130 ps FWHM.
the beam splitter. The photon number for each transmitter was
calibrated independently and remained stable for the duration of
the experiment.
The lasers were independently controlled and employed no
feedback between the two devices during a key exchange to remain
stable over several hours. Each transmitter wavelength was coarsely
overlapped using an optical spectrum analyzer. The lasers were
then finely tuned in steps of 80 fm through current injection of the
SOA. Interference between the two devices was used to precisely
overlap the wavelengths, as shown in Fig. 3. By using Alice’s |+〉
and |−〉 states as a reference, Bob can vary the wavelength of his
laser, which changes the phase between his early and late time bins.
As the phase of Bob’s qubits rotates, we find a sinusoidal beating
where the visibility increases as the states become indistinguishable
in wavelength. We demonstrate an error in the X basis of 30%,
which is limited to a theoretical minimum of 25% due to the
reduction in HOM interference from multiphoton terms [20].
Future systems could utilize this interference to provide active
feedback to minimize errors between the transmitters for long-
term stable operation. The Z basis errors are not dependent on the
interference and remained around 0.5% during the sweep.
In a time-bin encoding scheme, only two detectors are required
and |ψ±〉 can be distinguished through coincident clicks between
time bins. However, while in principle |ψ+〉 can be distinguished,
due to the detector deadtime (typically 100 ns), this event will
never occur, reducing the number of successful events and key rate.
While detectors exist with sub-nanosecond deadtime, they will
typically sacrifice detection efficiency or wavelength tunability
[21,22].
In this work, we utilize a banked detector system, which allows
an increase in the number of detection events by allowing |ψ+〉 to
be detected with 50% probability. This also means we can increase
the number of detection events before detector saturation, allow-
ing higher key rates to be generated even at shorter distances. With
waveguide integrated detectors being developed [23], we envisage
systems with many detectors and integrated switches facilitating a
completely integrated quantum key exchange.
The detectors used were superconducting nanowire single-
photon detectors with an operating efficiency of 80%, dead time
of 100 ns, timing jitter of 30 ps, and dark count rates of 100 Hz.
Fig. 3. Wavelength overlap: By varying the relative wavelength
between the two lasers, the X basis error oscillates as the time bins tune
in and out of phase. A reduction in visibility is due to the wavelength
detuning. We demonstrate fine control to achieve a 30% error, limited
to a theoretical minimum of 25%. Z basis errors are independent of the
interference and remain below 1%.
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Fig. 4. Key rate: Plot of the asymptotic key rates estimated from the
system over an emulated fiber link assuming 0.2 dB/km. We measure a
secret key rate of 12 kbps at 25 km, while at 100 km, 1 kbps of key can be
securely exchanged. A model of the system using experimental parameters
estimates that positive key rates are possible at distances of greater than
350 km.
Events were time-tagged to give absolute timing of events from
which coincidences and successful projections were determined.
Bell states were then matched to corresponding states offline to
determine errors and gains for key rate analysis.
D. Rates
MDI-QKD has been demonstrated between two independent
InP devices. Secret key rates were estimated over an emulated
fiber link (using variable optical attenuators assuming 0.2 dB/km)
and are shown in Fig. 4. At metropolitan distances (25 km), key
rates of more than 12 kbps are estimated at the asymptotic limit,
with positive key rates demonstrated up to 200 km. Beyond this
distance, the integration time required for a reasonable number of
detection events increases exponentially. For example, at 300 km,
we would need to integrate for six days. However, by characterizing
the experimental performance, we predict that a quantum-secured
key exchange is possible at distances of more than 350 km.
We show that interference between independent transmitters
is possible for 500 ps separated (2 GHz clocked) time-bin encoded
states with state of the art quantum bit error rates. We find an
error of 30% in the X basis, which is limited to a theoretical min-
imum of 25%, demonstrating a good indistinguishability in all
degrees of freedom. In the Z basis, we achieve a quantum bit error
rate of 0.5%.
The mean photon number was 0.2 in the Z basis for the signal
states. In the X basis, the mean photon numbers were 0.1 and 0.01
for decoy state analysis. The vacuum state intensities are kept at
5× 10−4. Low photon numbers were used to limit the saturation
of the detectors at low channel losses and allow positive key gener-
ation at further distances. The transmitter electronics are clocked
at 2 GHz, with a state being sent every eight clock cycles, giving a
250 MHz qubit rate. The bases were biased to produce an equal
number of Z and X states, and therefore each of the X decoy states
were sent one third as often as a Z signal state.
3. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In summary, we have demonstrated indium phosphide as a poten-
tial future platform for quantum-secured communication through
MDI-QKD. Over an emulated fiber link, we show 1 kbps of esti-
mated secret key at 100 km and positive key rates as far as 200 km,
and estimate the system would provide positive key rates at dis-
tances of more than 350 km. Quantum bit error rates below 0.5%
are demonstrated along with high-fidelity interference between
independent devices at a qubit rate of 250 MHz, comparable to
previous demonstrations [7–9].
Integrated photonics offers benefits for future networks with
reduced power, weight, and size requirements, while simulta-
neously facilitating increased complexity with inherent phase
stability. Indium phosphide devices are shown as a feasible plat-
form for QKD networks, allowing relatively cost-effective devices
to be easily mass-manufactured. Integrated laser sources and effi-
cient phase modulation satisfy all the requirements of high-fidelity
quantum state preparation in a single monolithically fabricated
platform.
The topology of MDI-QKD means that citywide resource
sharing can be achieved through commercially available optical
switches at an untrusted centralized location. Furthermore, banks
of detectors can be used to increase secret key rates. Advances in
cryogenic cooling mean superconducting detectors are becom-
ing more readily available and will likely be a vital part of future
quantum-compatible networks. Such nodes will form the basis
for more complex communication protocols that will require
quantum repeaters and photonic information processing [24].
The simplicity of the receiver in MDI-QKD lends itself towards
an integrated platform [25]. Waveguide integrated single-photon
detectors [26], on-chip wavelength demultiplexing [27], and
cryogenic optical switching [28] mean that a completely integrated
receiver device could further decrease the cost of QKD systems.
Fully integrated measurement devices facilitate a drastic increase in
the number of detectors to allow a higher count rate before satura-
tion and relax the need for sub-nanosecond deadtimes. Key rates
could be further increased through wavelength division multiplex-
ing, which can also allow coexistence with classical signals [29].
Specialized electronics could be used to truly take advantage of the
size, weight, and power efficiency of an integrated system [30].
It is becoming increasingly vital that the future of secure com-
munication is addressed to counter advances in classical and
quantum computing. While quantum key distribution has been
demonstrated as a potential candidate in future networks, it has
yet to be widely adopted. Concerns of side-channel attacks on
physical implementations undermines the security promises of
QKD systems. Here, we have improved on previous demon-
strations of integrated QKD systems by removing all detection
side-channels, which vastly increases confidence in the security of
the system. Mass-manufacturability and robust operation mean
that integrated systems are poised to create an accessible platform
for widespread quantum-secured communication.
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